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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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decimation of the Ukraine haunted the imagination of its neighbours.
From this fear the next step was sheer desperation. Those among the
endangered nations who had unwillingly supported Germany in her
invasion of the Soviet Union., now whole-heartedly stood side by side
with Hitler against a Red Army attack on their country. Russian demands,
presented at the time when that Army was fast approaching those countries
who had been ready to quit Hitler's camp, demands which included part
of their territories, and contained additional clauses which would place
them at the mercy of Russia,, had the effect of once again frightening those
countries into tightening their bonds with the Germans. Although the
chance of success with Hitler was relatively small, surrender to Moscow,
to whom the word e mercy ' was unknown, meant—the end.*
Sure of its victory, the Kremlin used the language of threats, not
promises, towards these German collaborators, and conducted its cam-
paign under the slogan " No pity for Hitler's satellites i " The net result
of this policy was that the peoples of the Middle Zone, then bound to
Hitler., could see no advantage in abandoning him. It meant a pro-
longation of the war and was contrary to the interests of the United
Nations, but, as in the long run it would be advantageous to Moscow, the
Soviets did not hesitate to pursue this campaign.
Poland, alone among the countries of Central Europe, resisted Germany.
Her action spoiled the picture the Kremlin intended to present of a Europe
which should be punished after its c liberation/ and the Kremlin, there-
fore, did everything within its power to push Poland into Hitler's camp.
A campaign of slander was instigated in order to convince the United
Nations that, in point of fact, the Poles were already in that camp.
The situation grew more urgent and dramatic as the Red Army
approached nearer the frontier of the Polish Republic. In anticipation
of that advance, the Polish Government had issued an order to their
Underground Army on October 27, 1943, " to avoid all conflicts with the
* The Times, May 2nd, 1944:
The Germans have already achieved good results, as seen in the mobilisation of
€0>UOO in Estonia and 80,000 in Latvia while Hungary and Rumania have come
wholeheartedly in the battle line . . . Germany's Allies are held in battle-array
by fear—fear of Russian imperialism.
Germany's grip on Eastern Europe to-day depends on this fear more than on
anything else. Since the autumn the Germans have continued to harp on the
theme that Russian terror, massacre, deportation* and national extinction is the sole
alternative to a German victory *3 and it would be idle to .pretend that this view is
not widely shared at present in the countries concerned.
The Germans still find Poland a hard nut to crack. In spite of serious efforts
recently they have not succeeded in finding any Polish quisling, nor have they
managed to raise any sort of Polish armed units to fight on their side . . . The
Germans show that they keenly feel the presence of a large and elusive Polish
underground army which frequently adds to their general disquiet by acting openly
above ground.
The potentialities of this disciplined force are unquestionably affecting German